新闻概述
2023年9月7日，欧盟委员会发布了一份关于实施尽职调查以阻止规避对俄制裁的一般性指导文件（以下简称“《指南》”）。该《指南》包括：
- 可能规避制裁的风险评估
- 尽职调查最佳实践
- 与商业伙伴和买家有关的规避警示信号；
- 以及欧盟制裁举报工具。
尽职调查最佳实践部分涉及利益相关者和交易层面以及货物本身层面。根据欧盟委员会的说明，该《指南》旨在概述欧盟运营商在根据欧盟法律要求进行尽职调查时需要做哪些工作。
根据欧盟法律，欧盟经营者有义务在与第三国开展贸易时进行尽职调查，以确保其商业伙伴不会规避欧盟制裁。《指南》提供了一份规避警示信号（red-flag）清单。这些警示信号与商业伙伴和客户有关，是旨在提醒欧盟运营商在与新的贸易伙伴建立商业关系时注意可能存在的风险的指标。
（图片来源：欧盟委员会网站）
以下为《指南》原文及机器翻译的中文版，供读者参考。如中英文意思有出入的，请英文版本为准。
| Introduction | 简介 |
| The European Union has imposed unprecedented restrictive measures (‘sanctions’) in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the complicity of Belarus in it. One of the objectives of the sanctions is to weaken the Russian government’s ability to finance its war. | 针对俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争以及白俄罗斯在其中的共谋行为，欧盟实施了前所未有的限制性措施（“制裁”）。制裁的目的之一是削弱俄罗斯政府为战争融资的能力。 |
| Faced with the scale of the sanctions, Russian targets have consequently deployed various techniques to circumvent these measures, for instance by using complex financial schemes, falsifying the nature or origin of the goods traded or relying on the jurisdictions of third countries. Listed persons and entities have also made efforts to conceal their assets. | 面对制裁的规模，俄罗斯的目标因此采用各种技术来规避这些措施，例如使用复杂的金融计划，伪造贸易货物的性质或原产地，或依靠第三国的管辖权。被列入名单的个人和实体还努力隐藏其资产。 |
| As a result, there is an increased risk that EU operators will find themselves in a position where they may facilitate prohibited activities involving Russia, thereby reducing the impact of the sanctions and possibly violating EU regulations. Such increased risk justifies the development of an enhanced due diligence model, in particular for high-risks sectors and complex supply chains. | 因此，欧盟运营商发现自己可能为涉及俄罗斯的违禁活动提供便利的风险增加，从而减少制裁的影响，并可能违反欧盟法规。由于风险增加，有理由制定强化尽职调查模式，特别是针对高风险部门和复杂供应链。 |
| EU operators incorporated or constituted under the law of an EU Member State are directly required to comply with EU sanctions law. | 根据欧盟成员国法律成立或组建的欧盟运营商必须直接遵守欧盟制裁法。 |
| This guidance aims at providing a general overview of the main points of consideration for EU operators in view of their due-diligence work and is intended to support their compliance efforts. It is not meant to be an exhaustive document applicable to all sectors and tvpes of Eu operators. Depending on new circumvention pattens, the list of recommended due diligence measures will be updated accordingly. Current focus of the guidance are export related sanctions, however EU operators are expected to have due-diligence measures for all their relevant activities that might fall under the scope of EU sanctions. | 本指南旨在为欧盟运营商提供其尽职调查工作的主要考虑要点的总体概述，并旨在支持其合规工作。它并不意味着是一份适用于所有部门和所有类型的欧盟运营商的详尽文件。根据新的规避模式，将相应更新建议的尽职调查措施清单。该指南目前的重点是与出口相关的制裁，但预计欧盟运营商将对其可能属于欧盟制裁范围的所有相关活动采取尽职调查措施。 |
| In addition to this guidance, the Commission has published lists of sanctioned high-priority battlefield items and economically critical goods to support due diligence and effective compliance by exporters and targeted anti-circumvention actions by customs and enforcement agencies of partner countries determined to prevent that their territories are being abused for circumvention of EU Russia sanctions purposes. Annex IV of the Council (EU) Regulation 833/2014 includes a list of entities in Russia and in certain third countries with close commercial or other links to the Russian military. This list has been periodically updated. Other jurisdictions publish similar information about entities that present higher risks of circumvention. | 除这一指导外，欧盟委员会还公布了受制裁的高度优先战场物品和经济上至关重要的货物清单，以支持出口商的尽职调查和有效遵守，并支持伙伴国家的海关和执法机构采取有针对性的反规避行动，决心防止其领土被滥用于规避欧盟对俄罗斯的制裁。理事会（欧盟）第833/2014号条例附件四列出了俄罗斯境内和某些第三国境内与俄罗斯军方有密切商业或其他联系的实体名单。这份名单定期更新。其他司法管辖区公布了关于存在较高规避风险的实体的类似信息。 |
| Risk assessment of possible sanctions circumvention | 对可能规避制裁的风险评估 |
| EU operators should identify, assess, and understand the possible risks of circumvention, most relevant for their business activity and operational model and should take action to mitigate these risks. This should be carried out on a recurring basis, based on open sources information on the evolution ofcircumvention techniques. It should be noted that EU operators that set up transactions, rather than merely facilitate them, are in a better position to assess the risk and perform due diligence. In addition, depending on the nature of the transactions (e.g. commercial, export/import) the stakeholders in a position to detect sanctions circumvention may vary. | 欧盟运营商应识别、评估和了解与其业务活动和运营模式最相关的可能规避风险，并应采取行动减轻这些风险。应根据关于规避技术演变的公开来源信息，定期开展这项工作。应该指出的是，建立交易而不仅仅是为交易提供便利的欧盟运营商更有能力评估风险并进行尽职调查。此外，根据交易的性质（如商业、出口/进口），有能力发现规避制裁行为的利益攸关方可能有所不同。 |
| As stated in the European Commission’s FAQs on Russian sanctions, “EU operators have to perform appropriate due diligence calibrated according to the specificities of their business and the related risk exposure. It is for each operator to develop, implement, and routinely update an EU sanctions compliance programme that reflects their individual business models, geographic areas of operations and specificities and related risk-assessment regarding customers, business partners and staff.” | 正如欧盟委员会关于俄罗斯制裁的常见问题中所述，“ 欧盟运营商必须根据其业务的特殊性和相关风险敞口进行适当的尽职调查。每个运营商都应制定、实施和定期更新欧盟制裁合规计划，该计划应反映其各自的业务模式、业务地理区域和具体情况以及关于客户、业务合作伙伴和员工的相关风险评估。” |
| To mitigate to the maximum extent their exposure to possible sanctions circumvention schemes, EU operators should conduct a strategic risk assessment, following these successive steps: | 为了最大限度地减少其可能面临的制裁规避计划，欧盟运营商应按照以下连续步骤进行战略风险评估: |
| I. Identification of threats and vulnerabilities: Risk can be defined as the ability of a threatening agent to exploit a vulnerability. EU operators should stay alert to the main techniques used by Russian actors to circumvent sanctions, as well as to the emerging patterns. They should also map out the types of products, transactions and economic activities within their range of services that are at risk of being involved in Russian sanctions circumvention techniques (see 2b “Examples of typologies of sanctions circumventions”). | I. 威胁和漏洞的识别：风险可以定义为威胁代理利用漏洞的能力。欧盟运营商应对俄罗斯规避制裁的主要手段以及新出现的模式保持警惕。他们还应列出其服务范围内有可能涉及俄罗斯规避制裁技术的产品、交易和经济活动的类型（见2b “规避制裁类型示例”）。 |
| Examples of who might be particularly impacted and need to exercise particular vigilance. | 可能受到特别影响并需要特别警惕的人的例子。 |
| Example (1): An EU based manufacturer of semiconductor devices. It is well known that these goods are in high demand in Russia and their export to Russia from the EU is prohibited. The volume of exports is increasing towards third countries with which trade was previously limited or non-existent. | 示例（1）：一家位于欧盟的半导体设备制造商。众所周知，这些商品在俄罗斯的需求量很大，欧盟禁止向俄罗斯出口这些商品。对以前贸易有限或不存在贸易的第三国的出口量正在增加。 |
| Example (2): An EU based manufacturer of items identified in the list of high-priority battlefield items. It is well known that battlefield items are in high demand in Russia and their export to Russia is subject to export restrictions from the EU. | 示例（2）：高优先级战场物品清单中确定的物品的欧盟制造商。众所周知，战场物品在俄罗斯的需求量很大，对俄罗斯的出口受到欧盟的出口限制。 |
| Example (3): An EU based manufacturer of goods which have a very specific tariff classification and as such may or may not fall in the scope of the export ban. | 示例（3）：欧盟制造商生产的商品具有非常具体的关税分类，因此可能属于也可能不属于出口禁令的范围。 |
| Example (4): An EU based manufacturer of goods which may be often and easily miscategorised under an HS code not subject to sanctions. | 示例（4）：欧盟制造商的货物可能经常且容易被错误归类为不受制裁的HS代码。 |
| Example (5): An EU based freight forwarder company that is organising the transport of the exported goods. | 示例（5）：组织出口货物运输的欧盟货运代理公司。 |
| II. Risk analysis: Operators should assess the nature of the risks to which their sector, products and economic activities are exposed to, and understand how those risks can materialise. To this end, they may use risk indicators, typologies and any other relevant information that is publicly available or forms part of their specialised knowledge. | II. 风险分析：经营者应评估其行业、产品和经济活动所面临风险的性质，并了解这些风险是如何发生的。为此，他们可以使用风险指标、类型学和任何其他可公开获得的或构成其专业知识一部分的相关信息。 |
| Example (1):main risks identified：attempts of transferring goods to Russia via third countries；how can the risks they be prevented：enhanced evaluation of the risk by trained staff, monitoring of contractual arrangements for customers and business partners, ensuring the processing and end-use of the product. | 示例（1）：查明的主要风险：通过第三国向俄罗斯转运货物的企图；如何预防风险：由受过培训的工作人员加强对风险的评估，监测客户和商业伙伴的合同安排，确保产品的加工和最终使用 |
| III. Design of mitigating measures: How can the risks be prevented? What are the measures to implement in order to mitigate these risks? Which are the relevant national authorities to raise operators’ awareness of the risk and provide guidance? | III. 设计补救措施：如何预防风险？有哪些措施可以降低这些风险？哪些相关国家机构可以提高运营商的风险意识并提供指导？ |
| IV. Implementation of mitigating measures: To mitigate the risk of circumvention, EU operators that identify higher risk areas in their business may proactively incorporate, as appropriate, the results of steps I1) and II3) into their internal risk management practices and procedures, and have controls in place to test the effective functioning of those procedures. | IV.实施补救措施：为减轻规避风险，欧盟运营商在其业务中发现高风险领域时，可主动将步骤 I1)和 II3) 的结果酌情纳入其内部风险管理实践和程序，并实施控制措施，以测试这些程序的有效运作。 |
| V. Regular updating: The evolution of circumvention techniques and the use of increasingly complex methods of circumvention require the mapping of threats and vulnerabilities is updated whenever necessary, for instance when sanctions are amended or new sanctions are adopted, and in any case on a regular basis. This requires that the operator has satisfactory procedures in place for following and updating maintaining the necessary information (e.g. sanctions legislation, circumvention techniques, circumvention trade flows) up-to-date. The training of the staff on these issues is of critical importance, as well. Moreover, it is recommended that senior management of a company is personally involved and informed regularly by company compliance officers on risks identified and measures taken. | V. 定期更新：规避技术的演变和日益复杂的规避方法的使用要求在必要时更新威胁和脆弱性的图表，例如在修订制裁或通过新的制裁时，在任何情况下都要定期更新。这就要求经营者制定令人满意的程序，以跟踪和更新必要的信息（如制裁立法、规避技术、规避贸易流动）。就这些问题对工作人员进行培训也至关重要。此外，建议公司高级管理层亲自参与，并由公司合规官员定期向其通报所发现的风险和所采取的措施。 |
| By adopting a risk assessment and risk management approach to circumvention, EU operators will help ensure that measures taken to prevent or mitigate circumvention are commensurate with the risks identified. | 通过对规避行为采取风险评估和风险管理办法，欧盟运营商将有助于确保为防止或减轻规避行为而采取的措施与所确定的风险相称。 |
| The implementation of risk assessment and risk management should also enable EU operators to concentrate their efforts on the most sensitive cases and thus allocate their resources in the most effective way. | 风险评估和风险管理的实施还应使欧盟运营商能够集中精力处理最敏感的案件，从而以最有效的方式分配资源。 |
| 1. Enhanced due diligenceAlthough there is no single model for conducting due diligence, EU operators should, following the assessment of circumvention risks and typologies outlined in this guidance, align their efforts to comply with the risks identified. This risk assessment and risk management approach should lead EU operators to adopt a proportionate approach and, in particular, by placing focus on those sectors that are deemed to be most critically exposed to circumvention risks, and accordingly put in place adequate commensurate systems to prevent those risks from occurring (‘enhanced due diligence’). | 1. 强化尽职调查尽管没有开展尽职调查的单一模式，但欧盟运营商应在本指南概述的规避风险和类型评估之后，调整其工作，以遵守已确定的风险。这种风险评估和风险管理方法应促使欧盟运营商采取相称的方法，特别是将重点放在那些被认为最容易受到规避风险影响的部门，并相应地建立适当的相应系统，以防止这些风险发生（”强化尽职调查”）。 |
| a) General good practices | a) 一般良好做法 |
| As stated in the European Commission’s FAQs, There is no one-size-fits-all model of due diligence. It may depend – and be calibrated accordingly – on the business specificities and the related risk exposure. It is for each operator to develop, implement, and routinely update an EU sanctions compliance programme that reflects their individual business models, geographic and sectoral areas of operations and related risk assessment. Such sanctions compliance programmes can assist in detecting red flag transactions that can be indicative of a circumvention patter： | 正如欧盟委员会常见问题解答所述，尽职调查没有放之四海而皆准的模式。它可能取决于业务的特殊性和相关的风险敞口，并进行相应的调整。每个经营者都应制定、实施并定期更新欧盟制裁合规计划，该计划应反映其各自的业务模式、运营的地理和部门领域以及相关的风险评估。此类制裁合规计划有助于发现可能表明规避模式的 “警示信号 “交易：发现可能表明规避模式的 “警示信号 “交易。 |
| Good practices can be adopted when implementing enhanced due diligence (e.g. when the EU operator’s activity exposes him to a particular risk), at different levels: | 在实施强化尽职调查时（例如，当欧盟运营商的活动使其面临特定风险时），可在不同层面采用良好做法： |
| On/at the stakeholders level (identification and verification of business partners, customers, their representatives, their beneficial owners and other possible persons of interest): | 在利益相关者层面（识别和核实业务伙伴、客户、客户代表、客户受益所有人和其他可能的利益相关者）： |
| Is there any proven business record?Is there any effort from the stakeholder to maintain sanctions internal control systems /ensure sanctions compliance?Who are the main stakeholders involved/relevant for my business?Are any of the direct stakeholders (customers, distributors, agents, etc.) or indirect stakeholders (end-user, intermediaries, banks etc.) targeted by EU sanctions? Do we know all stakeholders?If yes, did the stakeholder undergo changes in their ownership structure upon or after the adoption of sanctions? Was it set up or established after the introduction of the sanctions?Are these stakeholders affected by sanctions through ownership or control?Who is the end user? Can the end user certificate be provided? | 是否有任何经证实的业务记录？利益相关者是否努力维护制裁内部控制系统/确保遵守制裁规定？与我的业务有关/相关的主要利益相关者是谁？是否有直接利益相关者（客户、分销商、代理商等）或间接利益相关者（最终用户、中介、银行等）成为欧盟制裁的目标？我们是否了解所有利益相关者？如果回答为 “是”，利益相关者的所有权结构是否在制裁通过时或之后发生了变化？是否在实施制裁后成立或建立？这些利益相关者是否通过所有权或控制权受到制裁的影响？谁是最终用户？能否提供最终用户证书？ |
| On/at the transaction level, flows of money and route of goods, transportation companies involvement and responsibility: | 在交易层面，货币流动和货物路线、运输公司的参与和责任 |
| What is the country of origin/transit/destination of the goods? What is the country of transit and of destination? Is this country neighbouring Russia or Belarus, has easy transport / access (i.e. passport/shipping controls) to Russia or Belarus, or otherwise known to re-export goods to those jurisdictions? Should the export be subject to enhanced vigilance/end-use controls?Are complex/unusual transportation routes being used? Has the value of goods changed since the imposition of sanctions? Has the method of trading/transacting changed, e.g. contract conditions imposed? What is the business rationale for the transaction? Does the transaction or shipment seem in line with expectations regarding the (prospective) customer from a business perspective? Or does the transaction or shipment seem unjustified from a business perspective?Does the transaction use complex financial schemes which are not justified by its purpose?Has the method of transport/shipping changed since the imposition of sanctions? Are there unusual or abnormal elements in the documentation that do not match (e.g. between financial and contract)?Any other red flag? (see below) | 货物的原产国/过境国/目的地是哪里？过境国和目的地国是什么？该国是否与俄罗斯或白俄罗斯相邻，是否易于运输/进入俄罗斯或白俄罗斯（即护照/运输控制），或是否已知向这些司法管辖区再出口货物？是否应加强对出口的警戒/最终用途管制？是否使用复杂/不寻常的运输路线？自实施制裁以来，货物的价值是否发生了变化？交易/交易方法是否发生了变化，例如合同条件是否发生了变化？交易的商业理由是什么？从业务角度来看，交易或装运是否符合（潜在）客户的预期？或者从商业角度来看，交易或装运似乎不合理？交易是否使用了与其目的不相符的复杂金融方案？自实施制裁以来，运输/航运方式是否有所改变？文档中是否存在不匹配的异常或不正常元素（例如，财务和合同之间）？还有其他警示信号吗？（见下文） |
| On the goods: | 关于货物: |
| Are the goods subject to any EU sanctions or export/import control rules?Are the goods included in the list of high-priority battlefield items or on the economically critical goods list?Do the goods contain components that are more likely to be disassembled and diverted for non-intended purposes?Are the goods similar to sanctioned ones? If the goods are shipped through Russia or Belarus, is the route standard and economically viable?Particular attention should be paid for exports to countries which do not apply restrictions on exports of sensitive goods to Russia and Belarus (see notice of 1st April 2022). | 货物是否受任何欧盟制裁或出口/进口管制规则的约束？货物是否包括在高优先级战场物品清单或经济关键货物清单中？货物是否包含更有可能被拆卸并用于非预期目的的部件？ 货物是否与被制裁的货物相似？如果货物通过俄罗斯或白俄罗斯运输，该路线是否标准和经济可行？应特别注意对俄罗斯和白俄罗斯未实施敏感货物出口限制的国家的出口（见2022年4月1日通知). |
| b) Best practices to address typologies of sanctions circumventions | b) 处理规避制裁类型的最佳做法 |
| Trade: preventing possible diversion to/from Russia and/or Belarus via third countries | 贸易：防止可能通过第三国转入/转出俄罗斯和/或白俄罗斯 |
| EU operators should have in place adequate due diligence procedures to ensure that their operations that deal with sanctioned for Russia goods are not diverted to Russia. | 欧盟运营商应制定适当的尽职调查程序，以确保其处理俄罗斯制裁货物的业务不会被转移到俄罗斯。 |
| First of all, in particular when exporting goods subject to restrictions, they need to know their counterparts and how reliable they are. They should include, in particular, contractual clauses with their third-country business partners prohibiting further re-exports of the items to Russia and Belarus, as well as possible ex post verifications. These clauses may take the form e.g. of a statement that the respect of such provision is an essential element of the contract, or of contractual clauses committingthe importer in third countries not to export the concerned goods to Russia or Belarus, and not to resell the concerned goods to any third party business partner that does make a commitment not to export the concerned goods to Russia or Belarus, which then give rise to liability in case the latter re-exports the items to those countries (notice to operators of 1st April 2022). It is vital that the contractual clause is valid and can be enforced under the law applicable to the contract. | 首先，特别是在出口受限制的货物时，他们需要了解其对应方及其可靠程度。它们尤其应在与第三国商业伙伴的合同中加入禁止向俄罗斯和白俄罗斯再出口相关物品的条款，以及可能的事后核查。这些条款的形式可以是：声明遵守此类规定是合同的基本要素；或者是合同条款，要求第三国进口商承诺不向俄罗斯或白俄罗斯出口相关商品，不将相关商品转售给任何承诺不向俄罗斯或白俄罗斯出口相关商品的第三方商业伙伴，如果后者将商品再出口到这些国家，则应承担相应责任（2022 年 4 月 1 日向经营者发出的通知）。合同条款必须有效，并能根据合同适用的法律执行。 |
| It is for Member States to implement and enforce sanctions. The Commission has the role of ensuring uniform implementation throughout the Union and monitoring enforcement by the Member States. | 实施和执行制裁是会员国的责任。委员会的作用是确保整个欧盟的统一执行，并监测成员国的执行情况。 |
| If a sanctioned item exported from the EU to a third country is re-exported as such to Russia, the competent authorities may consider the EU exporter’s failure to conduct adequate due diligence as a violation of EU sanctions law. Any suspicious activity in the field of trade should be reported, in line with legal requirements, to the relevant national authority, such as financial intelligence units, customs and border authorities or relevant supervisory authority, if any. | 如果从欧盟出口到第三国的受制裁物品再出口到俄罗斯，主管当局可将欧盟出口商未能进行充分的尽职调查视为违反欧盟制裁法。贸易领域的任何可疑活动都应按照法律要求向有关国家当局报告，如金融情报单位、海关和边境当局或有关监督当局（如有）。 |
| Banking and Finance: enhanced vigilance with regard to the use of correspondent accounts | 银行和金融：提高对使用代理账户的警惕 |
| Transactions relying on correspondent accounts can lead to a higher residual risk of sanctions circumvention. | 依赖代理账户的交易可能导致规避制裁的残余风险增加。 |
| Correspondent accounts are relationships between financial institutions that facilitate the provision of services from one (the correspondent) to another (the respondent). These services can relate to transactions for the respondent financial institution itself or on behalf of its customers, including processing wire transfers, international trade settlements, remittances, and cross-border payments. | 代理账户是金融机构之间的关系，有助于从一方（代理方）向另一方（被代理方）提供服务。这些服务可能涉及相应金融机构本身或代表其客户进行的交易，包括处理电汇、国际贸易结算、汇款和跨境支付。 |
| Financial institutions that maintain correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions are required to establish appropriate, risk-based enhanced due diligence frameworks, with policies, procedures, and processes that are reasonably designed to assess and mitigate the risks inherent with these relationships. | 为外国金融机构维护代理账户的金融机构必须建立适当的、基于风险的强化尽职调查框架，并制定合理的政策、程序和流程，以评估和减轻这些关系固有的风险。 |
| In the context of sanctions implementation, financial institutions should monitor transactions related to correspondent accounts to detect and prevent potential attempts to breach sanctions. Without prejudice to Anti-Money-Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements, their due diligence frameworks should take into account the level of risk of sanctions evasion posed by the foreign respondent. | 在实施制裁的背景下，金融机构应监测与代理账户有关的交易，以发现和防止潜在的违反制裁的企图。在不影响反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义（AML/CFT）要求的情况下，其尽职调查框架应考虑外国被告规避制裁的风险水平。 |
| The risks can vary depending on the respondents profile. In practice, this means that financial institutions may conduct an adequate assessment of risks and appropriate due diligence of the risks present in： | 风险可能因受访者的个人情况而异。在实践中，这意味着金融机构可以对风险进行充分评估，并对以下方面存在的风险进行适当的尽职调查: |
| (1) the foreign respondents business and markets；(2) the type, purpose and anticipated activity；(3) the nature and duration of the relationship with the foreign respondent; and(4) the supervisory regime of the jurisdiction in which the foreign respondent is licensed, and to design and implement controls to manage these risks effectively. | (1) 外国对应方的业务和市场；(2) 类型、目的和预期活动；(3) 与外国对应方关系的性质和持续时间；和(4) 外国对应方获得许可的管辖区的监督制度，并设计和实施有效管理这些风险的控制措施。 |
| 2. Circumvention red flags related to business partners and customers | 2. 与业务合作伙伴和客户有关的规避警示信号 |
| Various indicators8 should alert EU operators when they enter into a commercial relationship with a new trading partner. When conducting general due diligence, if operators find evidence of any of the indicators below, they should launch a deeper screening. | 当欧盟经营者与新的贸易伙伴建立商业关系时，各种指标应引起欧盟经营者的警觉。在进行一般尽职调查时，如果经营者发现以下任何指标的证据，就应进行更深入的筛查。 |
| Indirect transactions (such as those using intermediaries, shell companies etc.) that make no or little economic sense；New customer / transactions with companies located in countries known as ^circumvention hubs” and involving items listed as high-priority battlefield items.Transit through countries or territories known as “circumvention hubs” based on the information available. Specific measures that can be taken depending on the role and responsibility of the operator, e.g.:exporter who uses an external transport company: checks regarding the type of means of transport use, routings, use of sub-contractors, etc.transport company which is responsible for the transport of the cargo: checks regarding the actual goods to be transported; match with documentation, etc.Complex corporate or trust structures linked to countries friendly to Russia or whose complexity is not justified by the business profile of the customer. Use of trust arrangements or complex corporate structures involving offshore companies；Business partner has been recently established or has merged with a sanctioned entity or an entity linked to sanctioned entities or persons；Business partner shares address with multiple different companies (e.g., it is likely a shelf company)；Changes of ownership of a corporate holding to reduce ownership stakes below the 50 percent threshold;Change of ultimate beneficial owner shortly before or after sanctions are imposed;Movement of assets previously associated with a sanctioned person, by family members or otherwise on their behalf；Numerous transfers of shares from sanctioned entities to non-sanctioned entities involving corporations incorporated by the same individuals or entity (often with a registered office at the same physical address)；Potential control of an entity by a designated person, despite apparent direct ownership under the 50 percent threshold (member of Board of Directors, beneficial owner, managing director, other entities or persons on the ownership structure linked with a designated person)；CEO/manager is never available for discussions, i.e., all communications go via a regular employee or a representative who seems to have a general Power of Attorney (PoA). | 没有经济意义或经济意义不大的间接交易（如利用中介、空壳公司等进行的交易）。与位于被称为 “规避中心”的国家的公司进行的新客户/交易，并涉及被列为高度优先战场物品。根据现有信息，通过被称为 “规避中心 “的国家或地区过境。根据经营者的角色和责任可采取的具体措施，例如：使用外部运输公司的出口商：检查使用的运输工具类型、路线、分包商的使用情况等。负责货物运输的运输公司：检查实际运输的货物；与单据等是否相符。与俄罗斯友好国家有关的复杂公司结构或信托结构，或客户的业务情况无法证明其复杂性。使用涉及境外公司的信托安排或复杂公司结构；业务伙伴最近成立或与受制裁实体或与受制裁实体或个人有关联的实体合并；业务伙伴与多家不同公司共用地址（例如，很可能是一家空壳公司）；公司控股权的变更，将所有权减至50%以下；在实施制裁前不久或之后，最终受益所有人发生变化；受制裁者的家属或以其他方式代表受制裁者转移以前与受制裁者有关的资产；受制裁实体向非受制裁实体的大量股份转让，非受制裁实体由相同个人或实体注册成立（注册地址往往相同）；被授权者对实体的潜在控制，尽管表面上的直接所有权低于 50%的门槛（董事会成员、实际所有人、董事总经理、所有权结构中与被指认者有关联的其他实体或个人）；首席执行官/经理从不参与讨论，即所有沟通都通过一名普通员工或一名似乎拥有一般授权书（PoA）的代表进行。 |
| Access to EU Commission documents and resources | 访问欧盟委员会文件和资源 |
| Commission website (opinions, FAQs)https://commission.europa.eu/sanctions Consolidated List of Financial Sanctionshttps://webgate.ec.eurwaeu/fsd/fsf EU Sanctions Maphttps://sanctionsmap.eu FAQ on restrictive measures in the area of aviationhttps://www.easa.europa.eu/en/the-agency/fags/eu-restrictive-measures-against-russia | 委员会网站（意见、常见问题）https://commission.europa.eu/sanctions 金融制裁综合清单https://webgate.ec.eurwaeu/fsd/fsf 欧盟制裁地图https://sanctionsmap.eu 关于航空领域限制性措施的常见问题https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/the-aqency/faqs/eu-restrictive-measures-aqainst-russia |
| EU sanctions whistleblower tool | 欧盟制裁吹哨人 |
| Sharing of information about EU sanctions violations can contribute to the success of investigations in EU Member States and increase the effectiveness of EU sanctions. | 分享有关违反欧盟制裁的信息有助于欧盟成员国的调查取得成功，并提高欧盟制裁的效力。 |
| If you are aware of possible violations of any EU sanctions, you can bring this to the Commission’s attention in a fully anonymous way. The information can relate, for example, to facts concerning sanctions violations, their circumstances and the individuals, companies and third countries involved.These can be facts that are not publicly known but are known to you and can cover past, ongoing or planned sanctions violations, as well as schemes to circumvent EU sanctions.https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/overview-sanctions-and-related-resources/eu-sanctions-whistleblower-tool_en | 如果你知道可能违反任何欧盟制裁，你可以以完全匿名的方式提请委员会注意。例如，信息可以涉及违反制裁的事实、情况以及所涉个人、公司和第三国。这些可以是不为公众所知但你已知的事实，可以涵盖过去、正在进行或计划中的违反制裁行为，以及规避欧盟制裁的计划。https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/overview-sanctions-and-related-resources/eu-sanctions-whistleblower-tool_en |